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ABSTRACT
Advances in industrial control lead to increasing incorporation of
intercommunication technologies and embedded devices into the
production environment. In addition to that, the rising complex-
ity of automation tasks creates demand for extensive solutions.
Standardised protocols and commercial off the shelf devices aid in
providing these solutions. Still, setting up industrial communica-
tion networks is a tedious and high effort task. This justifies the
need for simulation environments in the industrial context, as they
provide cost-, resource- and time-efficient evaluation of solution
approaches. In this work, industrial use cases are identified and the
according requirements are derived. Furthermore, available sim-
ulation and emulation tools are analysed. They are mapped onto
the requirements of industrial applications, so that an expressive
assignment of solutions to application domains is given.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial networks have been proprietary systems, set up for each
specific application scenario. With the rising importance of the
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), standardised and extensive
interconnectivity gains importance. The influence of networking
in production is increasing, control and maintenance tasks can
be performed remotely [1]. Well-established communication pro-
tocols, such as EtherCAT, Modbus, Modbus/TCP, PROFINET and
OPC-Unified Architecture (OPC-UA), as well as Commercial Off
The Shelve (COTS) hardware reduce the configuration and cus-
tomisation effort in setting up networks. On the other hand, the
increasing integration of communication into automation creates
a deeper penetration of industrial applications by communication
and computational devices. Recently, wireless protocols, such as
WirelessHART, ZigBee and LoRa add to the variability of solutions.
The increasing importance of networking for industrial applications
justifies a rising need for network simulation tools of industrial
environment. It is necessary for planning of network structures, for
the evaluation of timing criteria, for adaption of control algorithms
in Software-Defined Networking (SDN), and also for security ap-
plications. This work aims at providing an overview of existing
methods for simulation and emulation, enabling users to chose the
best suited method and to create the best fitted environment.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In section 2,
an overview of works analysing and categorising simulation envi-
ronments is provided. After that, relevant uses cases for simulation
of industrial networks are introduced in section 3. Requirements
derived from these use cases are explained in section 4, solution
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approaches are presented in section 5 and a mapping of these so-
lutions to the requirements is provided in section 6. The work is
concluded in section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
Due to the novelty of this topic, not much work has been done to
evaluate simulation tools for industrial applications. Terzi and Cav-
alieri considered simulation as a part of supply chain management
and a tool for change management [2]. Apart from that, work has
been done in evaluating well-established simulation tools for their
performance.Weingartner et al. compare the performance of five
network simulators [3], while Flores Lucio et al. analyse accuracy
of ns-2 and OPNET [4]. Pan [5], as well as Siraj et al. [6] consider
simulator environments and testbeds as means to save money, time
and effort in network planning. They present several tools and
compare advantages and disadvantages. The work of Göktürk ad-
dresses the same topics, after systematically distinguishing between
testbeds and emulation [7]. Furthermore, there are surveys address-
ing specialised fields of network simulation. Kösal analyses four
well-known simulators that support wireless networks [8], Naicken
et al. consider peer-to-peer network simulators [9], Martinez et al.
address vehicular ad hoc networks [10], and the work of Sarkar
et al. is about simulation of telecommunication networks [11]. In
addition to these use cases, several works address simulation tools
forWireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [12–16].WSNs are becoming
more relevant with the increase in embedded computing power. Dis-
tributing WSNs contains a relatively large organisational overhead,
justifying the use of sound simulation environments.
3 USE CASES FOR INDUSTRIAL NETWORK
SIMULATION
In this section, the different use case scenarios motivating the appli-
action of simulation environments are described in subsection 3.1.
Developments in technologies of interconnectivity, as well as the
integration of Internet of Things (IoT) devices into the industrial
environment create novel types of industrial networks, e.g. the IIoT.
After that, the simulation scopes are described in subsection 3.2.
Some use cases require a high-level view of a network without the
need for simulating a detailed behaviour, while others need well-
defined traffic packets. Finally, the difference between simulation
and emulation is explained in subsection 3.3.
3.1 Use Case Scenarios
In this subsection, the prototypical scenarios of industrial use cases
that could benefit from simulation are described.
3.1.1 Network Management Algorithms. A new set of use cases
is introduced due to Industry 4.0 [17], entailing new challenges
to industrial communication networks. The derivation of the chal-
lenges are introduced in [18]. These challenges create demand for
a sophisticated network management that, on one hand, is capable
of handling a heterogenous landscape of industrial communication
protocols. On the other hand, it needs to satisfy requirements like ul-
tra low latency, determinism, cross domain communication, depend-
ability, flexibility and security. There are innovative technologies
at hand that meet these requirements, sometimes in conjunction
with one another. Examples for these technologies are SDN, which
provides flexibility and scalability to networks, and Time-Sensitive
Networking (TSN), which allows for determinism of the network, as
well as Network Function Virtualisation (NFV), which can control
dependability relevant parameters in a centralized management
system. The modular combination of technologies can cause in-
terdependency, inferring the danger of a live-lock behaviour in a
control or management system. Due to this issue, sophisticated
algorithms capable of combine technologies and resolve interde-
pendency are required. Network management is needed in several
points of the work flow. First of all, integration of TSN and SDN
into a network can not be performed on a single switch. Complex
network scenarios have to be set up to be developed and evalu-
ated iteratively. Algorithms for network management require these
underlying technologies in order to be developed for a network.
The above mentioned circumstances yield to sophisticated require-
ments on the test environment in terms of flexibility, openess of
interfaces and scalability. Due to this a simulation is a preferable
way to deploy the test environment.
3.1.2 Digital Factory. The Digital Factory is a use case described
by Stef at al. [19]. It focuses on the simulation of a production unit
in an industrial environment. In doing so, the debugging can be exe-
cuted in advance of the setup and the deployment of the production
unit can be accelerated. Besides the simulation of the production
unit, a simulation of the network is crucial to provide an appro-
priate dimensioned network capable of meeting all technological
demands. Furthermore, it is possible to deploy major changes in
network settings in a simulated environment and run through the
debugging process, before implementing it on the running hard-
ware. In this way, possible network crashes can be avoided. In this
case the advantages of a simulation concerning deployment speed,
cost reduction are the main arguments for their usage. One char-
acteristic of the digital factory is a flattened automation pyramid.
Control is not necessarily introduced from a higher layer anymore.
Instead, entities on the same layer may communicate through net-
work boundaries. Many of such use cases include the necessity for
real-time communication, that consequently has to be addressed
by the simulation tool chosen for the scenario.
3.1.3 Honeypots. Deception is a well established method in
many domains. In IT security it is known as Deception Technology.
The most noteable implementation are Honeypots (HPs). HPs, in
their very essence, mimic resources such as Programmable Logic
Controller (PLC)s or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems. The deceptive capabilites rely on the quality of
simulation, more precise and comprehensive imitations allow for
a deeper insight into the interaction and therefore the motivation,
expertise and arsenal of hostile entities. As these insights are value-
able for prevention [20], detection [21] and attribution [22–24], the
use of HPs is promising for industrial security. They are also able to
cope with the most pressing challenges, such as durability, latency,
heterogeneity and encryption. The simplest industrial HPs support
common industrial protocols, such as Bacnet, OPC-UA or modbus
[25]. For those protocols, that are frequently employed in enterprise
and industrial environments, a large selection of HPs is available.
Examples are HTTP/HTTPS [26], FTP [27] and Telnet/SSH [28].
Since productive systems are usually interconnected, so are HPs.
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In this case, they are referred to as Honeynets (HNs). The infamous
honeyd [26] is an example for a HN implementation. Besides com-
munication capabilites, system simulation is also an integral part
of deception. Recent implementations use IMUNES/Conpot [29],
Matlab/Simulink [30] or gridlabd [31, 32] for system simulation.
3.1.4 Industrial IT Security. The increasing interconnectivity
and rising connection of industrial to public networks leads to
an enlarged attack surface of these networks [33]. In contrast to
home and office IT, industrial networks have been set up with little
thought of security. Since this resulted in, sometimes drastic, attacks
in recent years, this paradigm is changing. Security solutions, such
as industrial firewalls and Security Information and Event Manage-
ment (SIEM) systems are being developed. Furthermore, there is
a large research interest in detecting anomalies and intrusions in
industrial network traffic. Context information has proven to be a
valuable indicator [34], but is not trivial to obtain [35] Apart from
IT security reasons, anomalies can be an indicator of misconfigura-
tion or malfunction, motivating the need to detect them in a timely
manner. There are some works regarding anomaly and intrusion
detection in industrial network data [36]. Several surveys cover this
topic, such as the work of Garcia-Teodoro et al. [37] and Bhuyan et
al. [38]. Yang et al. give a brief introduction of these techniques for
the domain of SCADA systems [39].Meshram and Haas published a
roadmap of machine learning based anomaly detection in industrial
networks, containing a simulation environment, as well as a seman-
tic description of content [40]. Kleinman and Wool present a model
of the Siemens S7 protocol for intrusion detection and forensics [41].
Critical infrastructures and industrial environments are considered
in the work of Hadziosmanovic et al. [42]. A framework that detects
malicious and undesired actions is presented. Deriving features
that can be used to distinguish valid from malicious traffic is the
first step in applying an intrusion detection algorithm. Mantere et
al. look into the derivation of features from Internet Protocol (IP)
traffic in an industrial environment [43]. Deterministic properties
of industrial control systems, as well as the usability of this feature
for anomaly detection in an industrial environment, is researched
by Hadeli et al. [44]. Most of these algorithms need a large amount
of data in order to be properly trained. In contrast to home and
office network traffic, industrial network traffic is still rare. This is
an issueMorris and Gao describe in their work [45]. Therefore, they
introduce an intrusion detection dataset that, however, consists of
aggregated data instead of network packets. This renders is unfit
for anomaly detection algorithms that are packet- or timing-based.
In general, due to concerns regarding privacy, confidentiality and
effort, simulation will play a crucial role in intrusion detection
for industrial systems. Real world data sets are difficult to obtain,
mostly due to organisational issues. This means that research has
to use synthetic data or data that has been created in research envi-
ronment. The realism and consistency of this data is crucial, as the
results of an industrial Intrusion Detection System (IDS) depend on
them. Flawed data could lead to good results on the test data, but
weak performance in a productive environment. As the demand
and necessity of industrial intrusion detection will increase over
the next years, the need for data will rise.
3.2 Scope of Simulation
Apart from the use case scenarios as described above, the scope of
the simulation is of interest. First, the scope in terms of automation
level is discussed. After that, the scope in terms of geographical
spreading is examined.
3.2.1 Level of Automation. In the 1990’s, so-called automation
pyramid has been introduced. It is depicted schematically in fig-
ure 1. The different levels of a hierarchical industrial network are
ERP
MES
SCADA
PLC
Sensors/Actuators
Layer 5
Layer 1
Layer 4
Layer 3
Layer 2
Figure 1: Automation Pyramid
explained with this automation pyramid, as there are different re-
quirements for different levels. On layers 1 and 2, for example, real
time communication is often required. In addition to that, a physical
model of the production system is required for layer 1, which is
usually difficult to implement. Layers 4 and 5, Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) and Manufacturing Execution System (MES); sys-
tems, that control the setup and production processes of automation
devices, on the other hand, are mostly implemented using standard
TCP/IP networks. The SCADA system on layer 3 commonly em-
ploys non-real time Ethernet-based protocols.
3.2.2 Geographical Scope. Per Se, networks are employed to
connect different systems and enable communication. There are
several characteristics of networks. A typical set of scenarios is
depicted in figure 2. Depending on the scenario, simulation of traf-
Office Production
Internet
Office Production
Figure 2: Geographical Scope
fic in different parts of the shown networks can be relevant. A
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single connection between the PLCs in the production part of the
figure can be of interest, e.g. when the characteristic of a certain
antenna is to be determined. For network management, a whole
site, including connection between office and production area can
be under investigation. Furthermore, the connectivity possibilities
over public networks can be analysed, e.g. for security analysis.
3.3 Simulation vs. Emulation
In order to categorise solutions, a terminology has to be introduced
first. Generally, there is a semantic difference between simulation
and emulation, even though these terms are often used interchange-
ably. In this work, we will generally use the term “simulation” for
the sake of readability, since many tools can be used for both.
Generally, simulation aims at mimicking the states of a sys-
tem [46], while emulation aims at reproducing the behaviour [47].
This difference often becomes relevant in the type of experimen-
tal setup: As discussed in the following subsection, simulation is
usually done on one computer. That means that any physical char-
acteristic has to be modeled. The goal is to create a model of the
components under investigation and imitate the behaviour, as well
as internal states as accurately as possible. Sometimes, this leads to
a high effort in creating the simulation model. Emulation, on the
other hand, can be done on real network infrastructure with devices
imitating other devices. If only the transmission behaviour is of
interest, then the nature of devices creating the traffic is irrelevant.
Emulation therefore has the advantage that its output is, by design,
as accurate as the productive system, since the physical environ-
ment is used. On the downside, it usually has a higher requirement
in devices and physical space.
4 REQUIREMENTS FOR INDUSTRIAL
NETWORK SIMULATION
In this section, each of the use case scenarios, as described in subsec-
tion 3.1, is analysed. The requirements on a simulation or emulation
environment are derived from the characteristics and explained.
Furthermore, the scope in terms of abstractivity and geographical
extension, as described in subsection 3.2, is considered.
4.1 Network Management Algorithms &
Digital Factory
Industrial production is gaining flexibility. Future industrial pro-
duction systems are getting an increasingly dense interconnectivity
that has to serve a rising amount of network traffic, inflicting strin-
gent requirements on the network. This raises the necessity of an
autonomous operating and automatic self-organising-network to
be able to master the complexity. A possible solution for a Network
Management Concept is presented in [18]. A Simulation has to
mimic the real-world behaviour as accurately as possible, when
it comes to metering especially performance dependent aspects
of such systems. Even more important is an accurate replica of
industrial network systems for development of new solutions. In
case of analysing the fundamental behaviour of transmissions on
a network instead of functional high-level solutions, accuracy of
the simulation is crucial. The scope of this simulation sometimes
extends to the characteristics of singular packets on the physical
transmission medium, e.g. in safety packets that inflict hard real-
time requirements.
4.1.1 Timing Precision. A key demand for digital factories is
the ability to grant certain transmission guarantees, e.g. maximum
transmission time or reliability. While developing new transmission
mechanisms, protocols or overlaying methods influencing trans-
mission procedures, it is important to have the ability to measure
the timing behaviour of transmissions under the given circum-
stances. The essential point is that not only the functional aspect
of macroscopic or cumulated operations has to be evaluated, but
rather the fine-grained runtime performance of a set of operations.
This requires the simulation of a highly precise and representative
time base on which a realistc imitation of the transmission time
behaviour can be achieved. For protocols and low level methods, it
has to be evaluated if they grant the ability to meet requirements,
for instance transmission deadlines in general. Higher level meth-
ods need to prove that they properly interact with underlying or
cooperating procedures without disrupting.
4.1.2 Flexibility / Extensibility. A huge variety of differing com-
munication technologies, protocols and vendor-specific proprietary
solutions is assembled in industrial networks. In order to address
this characteristic by a simulation tool, it must provide the pos-
sibility to integrate novel modules above the physical level, such
as protocols or medium access methods. Additionally, when work-
ing on new communication technologies or fundamentals of them,
e.g. new waveforms of wireless transmissions, the physical and
transmission models of the simulation have to be adapted. For ex-
ample, the introduction of differing channel models to adjust the
simulation to different environments can be of value.
4.1.3 Real-World Interaction. Often, existing parts of a network
infrastructure should be integrated into a simulation. This can be
due to the extension of a network, or the effort it would take to
create a model of devices or infrastructure already existing. Basi-
cally, network simulation is predestined to interact with external,
real-world domains. In order to efficiently do so, simulation envi-
ronments need to provide interfaces to communicate with protocols
and devices they are modelling.
4.1.4 Trusty Physical Imitation. The ability to accurately mea-
sure physical influences on networks, to enable a realistic com-
parison of different communication technologies, is of high value.
These physical influences need to be modelled with sufficient accu-
racy for the simulation to provide results that will not deviate from
any real-world application. Usually, not all parameters are of equal
importance. An application example is the comparison of fading
effects in narrow-band and ultra-wide-band wireless communica-
tion.
4.2 Honeypots
In contrast to other use cases, HPs only rely on the perception
of the entity that it intends to deceive [48]. It is therefore impor-
tant to define the attack vector and simulate the corresponding
observations a hostile entity may encounter. For example, if the
attack scenario is most likely network sniffing, the network packets
should be generated in accordance to the communication stack of
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the system that is simulated. From a technical perspective, there
is a trade-off between quality of simulation and handling of the
systems. Systems with a more realistic imitation tend to be more
complex to monitor and secure as there is a wider variety of pos-
sible actions. There is an abundance of examples, where systems
that provide full-fledged operating systems are suffering from easy
detection, relay attacks and monitoring circumvention [49–53]. To
mitigate detection attempts, it is of significant importance to enable
a dynamic configuration, deployment and management of such
systems [54, 55]. However, not only technical requirements need
to be considered when applying such technologies. It must be en-
sured that the application is conform with law of the corresponding
jurisdiction [56].
4.3 Industrial IT Security
Industrial IT security is a very broad area with an abundance of
requirements. In this work, an effort is undertaken to generalise
them while being accurate enough to derive possible solutions.
4.3.1 Injectability of Malware. The first and foremost require-
ment of industrial network data generation for IT security is the
possibility to inject malicious traffic. This malicious traffic has to
fit the environment and correctly represent the instantiation of a
possible attack vector. In emulation environments with real net-
work infrastructure, executing malware with common penetration
testing tools, such as metasploit, is an option. This, however, is
not possible in network simulations running on one machine. If
simulation is chosen, the malicious behaviour needs to be modeled
and injected in a valid and sound fashion.
4.3.2 Variability. Due to the inherent unique nature of most
industrial networks, a versatile and adaptive data generation envi-
ronment is requried. In simulation, as well as emulation, adapting
or creating new scenarios requires reconfiguration and possibly
creation of new models. Tools need to be able to adapt to these
changes.
4.3.3 Viability and Soundness. Especiallywhen employingmeth-
ods of machine learning, many algorithms are prone to overfitting.
That means they focus on parameters that have little to nothing
to do with the actual traffic, but are artefacts of data generation.
The DARPA KDD cup ’99, for example, contains one feature that is
specific to all malicious instances, but solely stems from the simula-
tion model. If IDSs are tested on such data, they lack performance
once they are integrated into real world processes. To prevent fo-
cussing on invalid features and overfitting, data generation has to
be sufficiently sound and compatible to real world data. This is
commonly considered as the most difficult task in data generation,
especially since a user often cannot determine which feature has
which influence on an algorithm.
4.4 Requirements Summary
So far in this section, the requirements on all of presented use cases
have been described. In order to map the possible solutions, as
described in section 5, the requirements are summarised. In general,
there are five requirements for industrial network simulation that
are listed below:
• Timing precision describes the accuracy and timeliness of
traffic, which needs to be highly precise for TSN.
• Flexibility in setting up and changing simulation character-
istics
• Real world interaction, the capability to be integrated into
existing productive environments
• Trusty (physical) imitation describes the soundness and cor-
rectness of simulation
• Adaptability describes the potential to be adjusted andmapped
to novel scenarios
5 SOLUTION APPROACHES
In this section, several solutions are proposed and their advantages
and disadvantages discussed. The solutions presented in this section
are: Application specific solutions, ns-3, OMNeT++, and Mininet.
5.1 S1: Application Specific Solutions
Creating an application specific simulation tool allows for the high-
est level of flexibility, on the cost of the most effort needed. They
can be either simulation or emulation environments, or a mix. Fur-
thermore, real components can be used to model the system. Real
network parts can be used with simulated devices, for example. For
industrial IT security, Lemay and Fernandez provided a data set
from an application specific simulation [57]. Wang et al. provide a
simulation environment for SCADA security assessment [58], as
does Seidl [59]. and Siaterlis et al. [60], as well as Genge et al. [61]
introduce testbeds for research in industrial IT security.
5.2 S2: ns-3
Ns-3 is the name of an event-based open source network simulator
which can be used for researching on IP and non-IP based networks.
It aims at providing simulation models that are as realistic as possi-
ble and can be used as a network emulator, i.e. interconnected with
real world devices. Ns-3, being an event-based simulator, already
provides a time base and many other modules, including a WiFi
PHY and MAC layer implementation, wireless channel models and
protocol stacks. Therefore, ns-3 is a sound choice for simulating the
inter-connectivity of different networks, especially but not limited
to wireless networks, which makes it appropriate for modeling the
use case scenarios ”Network Management Algorithms“ and ”Digital
Factory“. Ns-3 provides different simulation models. In a closed sim-
ulation, ns-3 traverses through the simulation whilst it maintains a
changing event-list. Throughout runtime, ns-3 processes one event
after the other until the event-list is empty or a specified point in
time for the simulation end is reached. Events are caused explicitly
by instructions from the simulation program or can be raised by
other events during runtime (possibly infinitely). Alternatively ns-3
supports a real-time scheduler that facilitates interaction with real
systems.
Ns-3 itself is written in C++ and for its use provides libraries for
the programming language C++. Accordingly, ns-3 simulations are
in fact programs, written in C++, using the ns-3 libraries. An ns-3
simulation defines the involved network devices and per device the
used network stack and eventually running applications. Between
the devices the communication technology is specified with an
explicitly chosen channel model. If desired, one could implement
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custom channel models, completely new underlying calculation
methods or new physical influences and thereby introduce new
technologies. Admittedly, doing so would require a high effort. The
out-of-the-box implemented transmission channel replications of
ns-3 move somewhere between realistic accuracy and low compu-
tational expense but are adequately representative, like evaluated
by [62].
Likewise ns-3 can be extended with new protocols or any other
module that incorporates somewhere in the processing of data
through a network stack, across a network or if desired completely
local on one machine. Network devices in ns-3 aren’t full-featured
devices inclusive operating system (like it would be in the case of
mininet). Rather every cooperating piece has to be specified. As its
purpose to be a network simulator, the most common networking
features are already available in ns-3 to be deployed to simulated
devices. It is a substantial property of ns-3 that it is open source
and high-grade modular, which creates a maximum on flexibility
with the choice of willingness for effort up to the developer of a
simulation. Many features and accuracy are already available in ns-3.
If one desired is not, it is likely that the implementation of it would
be possible with a smooth incorporation to distinct ns-3 simulation
modules. Ns-3 indeed creates network packets and passes them like
real devices would. As a consequence, these packets can be treated
like real ones, for instance can be sniffed using libpcap, analysed,
logged, malformed or modified. Ns-3 offers the ability to capture
and process packets live, i.e. during the running simulation or to
log them for later use in various formats, like .pcap or plain ASCII.
5.3 S3: OMNeT++
The Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++ (OMNeT++) [63]
provides a C++-based network simulation platform, even though
“OMNeT++ is not a network simulator itself”. Devices and networks
are described within the environment provided. They are then
connected and communicate according to a given pattern on the
physical layer, based on a discrete event simulator. Integration
of higher layers is possible by employing so-called frameworks,
that implement protocols and functionality and can be used by the
OMNeT++ environment. Due to this extendibility, any functionality
can be integrated into the OMNeT++ environment. Wireless, as well
as real time applications can be simulated. Furthermore, the use of
OMNeT++ as an emulation testbed over a real network is possible
by employing sockets. In general, the functionality is similar to ns-3.
There are graphical user interfaces available for OMNeT++, making
introduction easier. Furthermore, the licensing model is different:
While there is an open source license for academia, industrial users
have to purchase a proprietary OMNeT++ distribution.
5.4 S4: Mininet
Mininet [64] is a network emulator available for Linux Operating
Systems. It is more high-level and oriented on using a network (e.g.
for development or testing of applications or control algorithms)
instead of researching on low-level network topics itself (such as
channel access schemes or synchronisation protocols for instance).
On boot, it creates a live interactive emulation environment, using
Linux Kernel utilities. Mininet creates a network of virtual hosts,
switches, controllers and links, within whose the hosts run standard
Linux network software. Mininet uses process-based virtualization
and network namespaces to run many1 hosts and switches on a
single OS kernel. The network connections are realized through
virtual ethernet (veth) pairs and pipes. Mininet out-of-the-box sup-
ports kernel and user-space OpenFlow switches and also controllers
to control the switches. Mininet is very light-weight compared to
many other virtualisation workflows. As shown in [65], it can yield
an efficient use of time and resources, providing interactive proto-
typing, scalability and straightforward sharing and collaboration
for close-to-real-world developing and testing. For controlling the
emulation setup, topology and conducted actions Mininet offers on
one side an extensible PythonAPI throughwhich predefined actions,
like network creation can be done. On the other hand there is also
a command-line interface that allows controlling the environment
as well as every single device live during runtime.
Due to the fact everyMininet host can be assumed as being a full-
featured Linux-device with ordinary access, the actual development
topic does not necessarily have to be integrated in the emulation
environment but rather can be independently worked on and just
be called from within the emulated network, exactly how using a
real network. Furthermore this applies also for concurrent access
of several developers.
Since Mininet runs on Linux, uses Linux utilities, acts like Linux
and does not aim to mimic any physical effects, it does not span any
unique calculation basis and thus doesn’t create an own isolated vir-
tual time-base ("in it’s own isolated world") that is depending on the
computational model or something like an internal Event-Handling.
Rather it acts like a real network would, only the scalability of an
emulated network depending on the computation power of the
executing device. Concomitant is Mininet capable of interaction
with real world devices. Using Network Interface Cards (NICs) of
the emulation executing device packets can be exchanged between
virtual Mininet devices and the real world.
Whereas Mininets goal is to provide a network to work on, i.e.
to emulate the behaviour of an interconnection and not to simulate
the behaviour of a physical transmission, it does not work on any
sophisticated channel or loss model. Mininet does indeed supply
some parameters for the transmission connection to deliminate
them from a perfect channel. For example one can limit the band-
width or specify a statistical packet loss rate (x% packets lost) but
that is not near as realistic as the opportunities made possible by
low level network simulations. This fact essentially limits the repre-
sentativity and accuracy of timing measurements for transmissions,
when intended to work on lower layer solutions.
From its mentioned intention, Mininet is highly usable for func-
tional development like application level communication or timing-
uncritical SDN-algorithms but cannot suit performance related
research that approaches how Data actually is transferred.
6 SOLUTION MAPPING
In this section, all solutions presented in section 5 are mapped onto
the requirements as derived in section 4, with notes on simulation
and emulation capabilites, as well as the scope that can be met.
1the developers successfully booted up to 4096
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An additional requirement, ease of use, has been added, since com-
monly, usability is an important feature in industrial applications.
This mapping is shown in table 1.
Solution S1, application specific solutions, provide the highest
possible degrees of freedom for timing precision, real world interac-
tion and adaptability. It is, however, neither flexible, as hardcoded
solutions are usually hardly adjustable, nor easy to use, respectively
implement. As it strongly depends on the singular case, it can be
both simulation as well as emulation, and it can be placed on any
layer of automation.
Solution S2, which is ns3, supports the use of a real-time sched-
uler which leads to a high achievable timing precision. This ability
in conjunction with many models which are realistic enough to be
used together with real-world network devices enables ns3 to be
used as a real-time network emulator. Due to its open-source na-
ture and the availability of many adaptable modules, the flexibility
and adaptability of ns3 is high, although working in the ns3 core
modules is effortful. The flexibility of ns3 arises also from its ab-
straction layer (e.g. node, net device, application, etc.) which allows
the adaptation of the simulation on different layers. The physical
interaction, in particular when it comes to wireless channels, is
simulated using different models. The suitability and accuracy for
different environments and use-cases follows from the accuracy of
the underlying ns3 model, which is sufficient for a large number
but not all of the imaginable situations.
Solution S3, OMNeT++, allows for good timing precision, is flexi-
ble and easy to adjust, as well as easy to use. The physical interaction
on the other hand depends on the simulation model, with all the
drawbacks of artifacts and inconsistencies. Furthermore, it is only
easily adaptable to scenarios and models already implemented in
libraries, novel methods take more implementation effort. It is a
simulation environment, however, it could be used as an emulation
tool. Physical sensor simulation is not possible, as well as ERP and
MES are out of scope.
Solution S4, Mininet, does not possess an own time-base and its
latency is limited by the resources provided by the host computer;
deterministic timing is therefore not possible. It behaves like a Linux
environment and its flexibility and adaptability is thus limited to
the Linux world. Being an emulator, the interaction with real-world
network devices is possible and commonplace. The consideration
of physical aspects is limited to a few very generic possibilities to
model the influence of a channel.
Additionally, it should be remarked that cost and licensing has
not been considered explicitly, as it is not a functional requirement.
Emulation in general is more costly than simulation, due to the
hardware needed. Furthermore, while ns-3 and Mininet are open
source, OMNeT++ demands for a license in case of industrial appli-
cation. On the other hand, open source software usually contains
so-called “copyleft”, forcing users to make tools using the software
available.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, four different kinds of scenarios in industrial appli-
cations are described. The requirements posed on each of those
scenarios are derived and summarised. After that, commonly used
solutions for network simulation are presented. The features they
Table 1: Requirements Mapped to Solutions
Solution:
Requirement:
S1 S2 S3 S4
Timing Precision ✓ ✓ ✓ •
Flexibility × ✓ ✓ •
Real World Interaction ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Trusty Physical Interaction ✓ • • ×
Adaptability ✓ ✓ • •
Ease of Use × • ✓ •
Simulation/Emulation Both Both Sim Emu
Levels of Automation 1-5 1-5 2-3 3-5
provide are mapped against the requirements, showing that most
requirements can be met by one or another solution approach, even
though there is no general solution meeting all requirements. The
employment of a specific solution approach strongly depends on
the use case and the kind of data needed. In addition to that, wire-
less networks require different simulation environments than wired
networks, and locally small networks have a different scope than
widespread networks with heterogeneous entities. While real world
hard- and software provide the most realistic results, they are most
difficult to set up, often negating the possible advantage with the
effort needed.
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